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ARTICLE I.
THOUGHTS ON THE RELATION OF PHYSIOLOGY TO
PSYCHOLOGY.
By THOMAS HUN, M. D., Prof. of the Institutes of Medi-
cine in the Albany Medical College.
I propose to show the connexion between the Physiolo-
gy of the nervous system, and Psychology, and to establish
the distinction between them. For want of attending to
this connexion, Psychologists have lost sight of an interes-
ting face of their science; for want of attending to this
distinction, Physiologists have fallen into great confusion,
and have been led into many absurdities and contradictions.
Physiology and Psychology embrace phenomena of dif.
ferent orders, and which are learned by different means.
Hence they may be distinguished from each other. These
two orders of phenomena are connected together, and to a cer
tam extent are mutually dependent. Hence the two sciences
have a point of contact, and it is important to examine this
point, and see how they touch without becoming confounded.
By means of the five senses, we become acquainted with
the external world. We find a substance having extension,
figure, impenetrability, color, and exhibiting certain changes
or movements, called phenomena. This substance which is
external to us, which possesses these properties, and exhib-
its these phenomena, we call matter, and these properties
and phenomena, we call material.
Our knowledge of the properties and phenomena of mat-
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ter, and of their relations, constitutes physical science, or
rather the physical sciences, for there are several. The
divisions of the physical sciences depend on the differences
in the properties and phenomena of the objects of nature,
and on the impossibility of reducing them to one general
principle. Thus, we find in living beings, phenomena which
are dtlThrent from those of dead matter, and it is impossible
to reduce the one into the other, by any means of analyzing
these phenomena we at present possess; and hence we have
a science of organized or living matter, and one of inor.-
ganized or dtad matter. In like manner, secondary divi.-
sions are established.
But all these sciences agree in this, that the properties
and phenomena they embrace, are learned by the five senses,
that they belong to something external to us, and not to us,
that this something has extension, figure, divisibility, exists
in a certain place, moves, and is called matter. Hence,
notwithstanding their differences, they are all connected
together as physical sciences, or sciences of matter.
But physical science ic not the whole of science. There
are phenomena which do not fall within its domain. When
I say, I think, I remember, I am angry, I am affirming tile
existence of phenomena which are real and certain; as much
so as when I say that this candle burns, or this pen falls. These
phenomena are itdeed those of which we are the most sure,
for I might listen with patience to one who should attempt to
persuade me that I do not see an object which seems to be be-
fore me, because my senses have already deceived me, btt if
one should undertake to persuade me that I am not angry
when I feel that I am so, or that I do not will, what 1 suppose I
will, his attempt would appear to me supremely absurd.
These phenomena of thought, will, &c., are then real.
Besides this, they do not seem to have any relation to ex-
tent, or space, or movement from place to place; they take
place in ourselves, and not in that which is external to us.
They are not learned by any of the five senses, for we do
not see ourselves will, nor hear ourselves will; nor can we
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touch or taste or smell vcilition; they are learned by con.
sciousness, an internal sense, which informs us of ourselves,
and what passes in us, but which gives no knowledge of
what is external to us, just as the five senses inform us of
the external world, and what passes in it, but give us no
knowledge of ourselves.
There are then phenomena, of The reality of which, we
cannot dout* which occur within ourselves, and not in that
which is external to us, which have no relation to figure, or
space, or movement, which are not learned by the senses,
but by consciousness; and just as we say that one class
of phenomena belongs to the external world, to a substance
called matter, so we say that these latter phenomena belong
to the internal world, to a substance catled mind,
It is true, that it is by consciousness that we are made ac-
quainted with the impressions made on the five senses, so
that ultimately, all our knowledge of the external world is
a matter Of consciousness. In this case, however, we are
conscious of impressions made on us from without, and
which are irresistibly referred to something external to us,
and between which and us, the senses have served as a
medium; while in the case of the phenomena of thought, will,
&c., we are conscious of what takes place, directly in us,
without any reference to the external world.
The man who should shut up his five senses, and endea-
vor to find the external world, matter, by his consciousness,
would be guilty of an absurdity, for consciousness, does
not reveal to him this external world, except throrgh the
medium of the senses. So the man who should neglect his
consciousness, and endeavor to find the internal world,
mind, by his five senses, would be guilty of a like absurdity.
It is true, that by the senses he might find the external
manifestations of mind, but of the phenomena them-
selves he could have no idea without consciousness.
When I see a man gesticulating in a certain manner, I con-
clude he is angry, not because I see his anger, for I see
only his gesticulations, but by my own consciousness I know
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what anger is, and how it manifests itself externally in me.
Had I ne ver been angry myself, I might have known that a
man in certain circumstances, would execute certain move.
ments, but I never could have had an idea of anger.
Since then, the phenomena of thought, will, feeling, &c.,
occurring within ourselves, and learned by consciousness,
are real, they may be studied, analyzed, and their relations
may be discovered; that is, they may form the basis of a
science, for to constitute a science, it is only necessary to
have phenomena having fixed relations to each other. Psy-
chology is the science which takes cognizance of mind,
and its phenomena, as Physical science takes cognizance
of matter and its phenomena.
To resume. There is then an external world of matter,
the properties and phenomena of which are learned by the
five senses, and the knowledge of this world constitutes phy.-
sical science. There is also an internal world of mind,
which is revealed to us by consciousness, and the know-
ledge of this world constitutes Psychology. The domain
of Physical science is, then, the external world, matter.
The domain of Psychology is the internal world, mind.
Such is the distinction between Psychology and Physical
science. To deny the propriety of this distinction, we must
either deny the reality of the phenomena of consciousness, or
we must show that these phenomena do not differ from those
learned by the senses. That is, it must be shown that those
phenomena which we refer to the simple, indivisible sub-
stance we call I, are of the same nature as those we refer
to the extended, divisible substance we call mailer.
Whether ultimately, matter and mind may be proved to
be one thing under different faces, whether a unity or third
term may be found which will unite these two terms, is a
question of metaphysics, of which the solution is not neces-
sary for my present purpose. The great point I wish now
to establish, is, that mind as we know it, is different from
matter as we know it. If in the progress of science, one of
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the two substances is to disappear, I doubt not, it will be
mind which will swallow up matter, and not the reverse.
I have now shown the distinction between Physical sci-
ence and Psychology; I proceed to show how they come in
contact.
Physiology is a branch of physical science. it embraces
the phenomena of organized matter, which are learned by
means of the aenses, and which even when studied in our
own bodies are recognised as belonging to something
external to us, and not as belonging to s. So far
as these phenomena relate to nutrition and reproduc-
tion, there is no danger of any confusion, but when we
come to the phenomena of animal life, or of the nervous
system, then we must proceed with great caution, if we
would avoid the errors into which physiologists have been,
and still are, so commonly led.
The phenomena of consciousness, psythological phenom-
ena are, in many cases, perhaps in all, accompanied by
movements in the nervous system. These movements ac-
company, but do not constitute jychological acts. These
acts take place, although we do not know there is a nervous
system, and are always very different from anything we
can conceive as occurring in this system. If anger, for
example, is accompanied by some movement or change in
a particular portion of the grey matter of the cerebral hem-
ispheres, we can not conceive that this movement or change
is anger. Take any conceivable change in this matter, any
movement molecular or in mass, and t would appear most
absurd, to call this movement anger. It would appear
absurd because we cannot conceive of anger as a material
movement which is cognizable by the senses; it is a phe-
nomenon of a diffent order, cognizable by consciousness.
That it should be accompanied by a material movement as
its cause or its effect, is a fact which we may attempt to
prove, it bears no absurdity in its face; but that it is this
material movement, is an assertion so absurd that common
sense at once rejects it.
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We have now come to the paint of contact between Psy-
chology and the Physiology of the nervous system, to the con-
tines of the material and spiritual world, and we must pro-
ceed in our investigation with caution.
Let us take the case of a sensation analyze it into its
elements, and see what belongs to matter, what to mind.
I lay my hand on the table, and feel. it. Thia is a sensa-
tion. This sensation is a mental phenomenon; so little ap-
parent connection has it with matter or a nervous system,
that many persons experience such sensations all their lives,
without knowing that there is a nerve, or what it is. But
we can demonstrate that besides this sensation, this mental
phenomenon, theie are material movements without which
it can not occur. Thus, if the nerve is divided, no sensa-
tion occurs when the impression is made on the hand, and
by a series of investigations, we find that an impression has
been made by the external object on the extremity of one
or more nervous fibres, that this impression has traveled
along these fibres to some point in the interior of the brain
which can not be determined in the present state of the sci-
ence, and when it has reached this point, the sensation is pro-
duced. Here arc two things, a nervous transmission and a sen-
sation. The first a material, the second a mental phenomenon.
The nervous transmission causes the sensation, but is not the
sensation; it is analogous to the transmission of electrical
currents along wires. Suppose now that an electrical cur-
rent, in its passage, finds a combustible matter, it will set it
on fire. Here the current causes the combustion, but it is
not itself combustion, so nervous transmission causes sensa-
tion, but is not sensation.
Suppose we could make the change which occurs in the
nervous fibre, or in the grey matter into.which it plunges, ob-
vious to the senses, and then, that we lay bare the parts in a
living animal and excite this movement, and say to a spec.
tator, look at this movement, change, whatever it may be,
this is sensation you are seeing would it not appear absurd?
Would not the man, thus addressed, say, it is impossible for
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me or any other person to see or feel in any way the sensa-
tion of another animal; I see a nervous movement, and that
may be the cause of the sensation; but the sensation itself
can only be felt by the patient, it is a matter of conscious-
ness, and I can not be conscious of what is going on in ano-
ther, though I may see all the material movements or
changes in his body.
One who had not read books of Physiology, who was
ignorant of all the confusion which arises from not distin-
guishing between nervimotion, or whatever else we may
call the material movements of the nervous system, and
mental acts, would suppose I was wasting time on a point
sufficiently clear. But those who read books of physiology,
even the most modern, who find sensibility attributed to the
nerves, and who have noticed all the floundering it causes
among writers on the reflex action of the spinal chord, some
of whom talk of sensations of which the individual is not
conscious, will agree with me as to the necessity of reform.
ing physiological language, and it may be, physiological sci-
ence on this point.
If we take the case of a voluntary movement, we find the
same elements entering into its production, but in an inverse
order. We have the volition a mental phenomenon, acting
upon nervous fibres in the brain at a point, which like that
where sensation is produced, cannot be determined with
certainty; the impression here made, is transmitted along
the fibre to the muscle or muscles, and the voluntary move-
ment succeeds. Here the mental phenomenon precedes the
nervimotion, instead of following it, as in sensation.
Volition is so manifestly an act of the mind, and not a
nervous action, that physiologists have avoided the error of
considering volition as a property of the nerves, though
there would be the same propriety iii it, as there is in as-
cribing to them sensibility.
Not only is it true of sensation and volition, that they are
connected with certain nervous movements, either as cause
or effect, but the same thing appears to be true of all the
8 Journal of Insanity. July,
mental operations. Various facts which are sufficiently
familiar to all physiologists, demonstrate that the mental oper-
ations are under the influence of the cerebral hemispheres,
and are perverted or suspended when these nervous masses
are diseased or destroyed. Still we must carefully bear in
mind the distinction between the nervous movements and
the mental operations, at the same time that we admit their
connexion.
As to the mode of the connexion between the mind and the
body, and how the one acts upon the other, it would be un-
profitable here to speculate. Descartes, who was one of
the first who clearly established the distinction between the
substance which thinks, mind, and the substance which is
cxtended, matter, found it impossible to frame even an hy-
pothesis of their mode of union, and in a kind of philosophi.
cal despair, resolved it all into a miraculous effort of God, a
divine assistance. Leibnitz invented his hypothesis of the
preestablished harmony, according to which the nervous
movements and the mental operations correspond, but with-
out any relation of cause and effect. Imagine two parallel
movements, one occurring in the nervous system, and the
other in the mind, and so arranged that they shall always
correspond in time, and you have the view of Leibnitz of the
mode of union of the soul and body. Hence, when I exe-
cute a voluntary movement, it is not the volition which
causes the movement in the nervous fibre, but this move-
ment occurs at the same time with the volition; and so sen-
sation occurs in the mind at the same moment that the im-
pression is made on the nervous fibre.
Others again, seeing that so long as this duality was ad-
mitted, no explanation of the reactions of mind and matter
could be possible, have endeavored to get rid of it. Some
have denied the existence of mind, and have made thought
an attribute of the substance matter. These are the mate-
rialists. Others have made matter only a mode of manifesta-
tion of mind. These are the spiritualists. While a third class
have endeavored to find a third term which should include
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both matter and mind. Such for example is the system of
Spinoza.
It is not necessary for Physiologists, nor even for Psy-
chologists, to attempt the solution of these problems of trans-
cendental mataphysics, problems which are so vast, so dif-
ficult of solution, that no one metaphysician has as yet been
able to seize more than one of their faces. For practical
purposes, we have a task more humble, but more easy. We
have to study, not the nature of the two substances nor the
nature of their relation, but this relation itself as it manifests
itself to the senses and to consciousness. The great ques-
tions for us to answer are these: what nervous movements
correspond to given mental acts? what is the mechanism of
these movements? and how are the mental acts affected by
changes in the nervous system or in the rest of the body?
Without undertaking to explain how an impression trans-
mitted along a nervous fibre gives rise to a sensation or is
accompanied by a sensation, we study the different elements
necessary for the production of sensations, and the modifi-
cations of sensation produced by changes in the nervous
fibre. So of the other mental operations. We can not
explain how it is that the instincts or the intellectual acts
should be connnected with nervous movements in the grey
matter of the hemispheres, but we may study the conditions
of this grey matter necessary for the healthy manifestation
of these acts.
Cabanis appears to have been the first who conceived the
idea of studying the connexion between the moral and physi
cal nature of man, not as a question of abstract metaphysics
but as a matter of fact to be settled by observation and exper
iment. His work on the Rapport.c du moral et du physique,
does indeed attempt a sort of solution of the metaphysical
question by denying the existence of mind, and this is the
portion of it which is the weakest and most amenable to
criticism, but to him at least belongs the glory of having
conceived thus clearly the problem of their relations as mat-
ters of fact.
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To resume. The Physiology of the nervous system em.
braces all the facts in relation to the movements, or changes,
which occur in the nervous matter. It is a science of facts,
cognizable to the five senses, and uses the same modes of
investigation as the other physical sciences.
Psychology is the science of mind. It is founded on facts
of consciousness which are not cognizable to the senses. It
embraces all the mental operations, which are very differ.
ent from changes in nervous matter, and hence Psychology
is not merely a chapter of physiology, but a separate and in-
dependent science.
But there is a connexion between nervous movements and
mental acts, the nature and mode of which is unknown.
The study of the facts relating to this connexion between
mans physical and spiritual nature, constitutes a middle
ground on which the Physiologist and Psychologist meet.
The Psychologist must come from the exclusive study of
facts of consciousness, in order to understand many of
the influences to which they are subjected, and the Physiol-
ogist in tracing nervous movements, comes at last to facts of
consciousness, for the comprehension of which he must look
to Psychology.
ARTICLE II.
ON IMPULSIVE INSANITY.
BY EDWARD DANIELL, ESQ., NEWPORT PAGNELL, ENG.
Communicated to the Provincial Medical and Surgical
Association, at the Anniversary Meeting, held at Shef.
field, July 30th and 31st, 1845.
The functions of the brain and nervous system in health,
and under disease, confessedly constitute an abstruse and
